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FINANCE AND BALANCED
GROWTH
ALEX TREW
University of St. Andrews
We study the relationships between various concepts of financial development and
balanced economic growth. A model of endogenous growth that incorporates roles for
both financial efficiency and access to financial services permits a better understanding of
the relationship between the size of the financial sector (value added) and growth. Higher
financial value added results from some, but not all, kinds of finance-driven growth. If
greater access rather than greater efficiency generates higher growth, then value added and
growth can be positively correlated. We present some preliminary empirical results that
support the importance of access alongside efficiency in explaining cross-country
variations in growth.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The literature on the relationship between financial development and economic
growth has become one of the most important in applied economics. The early
empirical work of King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) found that financial depth—the
size of the financial sector as a proportion of output—is an important explanation
for variations in growth across countries. The robustness of that connection has
been supported by subsequent studies such as Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998), Levine et al. (2000), and Rousseau and Sylla (2005).1 Although the argu-
ment that finance can matter for growth is well established, important variations
have been found in the significance and direction of the finance-growth connection
across countries [Demetriades and Hussein (1996)], across stages of development
[Rioja and Valev (2004)], and across time [Rousseau and Wachtel (2011)].
The empirical link between financial development and growth has been sup-
ported by the emergence of a theoretical literature on financial intermediation and
endogenous growth. Works such as King and Levine (1993b), de la Fuente and
Marı´n (1996), Blackburn and Hung (1998), Khan (2001), Aghion et al. (2005),
and Horri et al. (in press) offer a large number of ways in which financial
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efficiency—the costs of screening entrepreneurs, monitoring effort, providing
liquidity insurance, and so on—can impact the equilibrium rate of technolog-
ical progress and thus long-run growth.2 More recently, Laeven et al. (2009)
and Greenwood et al. (2010) have looked to incorporate endogenous financial
innovation into models of growth.
This theoretical focus on the efficiency of intermediation has been driven by
the dependence of endogenous growth models on the production of new ideas and
technologies. The complementarity between the empirical and theoretical findings
thus rests upon the implicit assumption that efficiency and depth are both good
proxies for the financial development that matters for economic growth in the long
run.
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on finance and growth by
developing simple models that can capture the connections between different
concepts of financial development when the economy is growing in the long run.
Doing so suggests ways to understand some of the more nuanced relationships
between finance and growth observed in the data and points in a number of
directions for future empirical research.
First, a simple neoclassical growth model demonstrates that balanced growth
restricts how financial efficiency is related to the quantity of financial services
(financial value added). Incorporating financial efficiency alone is not sufficient
to understand why the size of the financial sector might be positively related to
growth. This is because value added must be constant along the balanced-growth
path (BGP); when the long-run growth rate changes, value added and growth are
negatively related. To understand the implications of this, we second develop an
endogenous growth model that is extended to account for differences in access
to finance. This permits us to see how a positive relationship between value
added and the growth rate can emerge. Specifically, if finance-led growth results
mainly from improvements in access, then higher growth can be associated with
higher financial value added; if it results from greater financial efficiency, then the
correlation between value added and growth can be zero or even negative. The
theoretical importance of access can be related to aspects of models such as those
of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Rousseau (1998). The contribution of
this paper is in bringing together different concepts of financial development in a
simple model of growth with direct implications for the empirical literature. The
role for access also gives weight to a recent literature [see Beck and Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt (2008)] that stresses access to finance as a policy tool.
The endogenous growth model has two main implications for the empirical
assessment of the finance–growth nexus. The first is that a focus on the size of
the financial sector alone is not a reliable indicator of growth-promoting financial
development. The findings noted previously that the finance–growth connection
has weakened over time or is dependent on the stage of development are consistent
with this theoretical implication, but a proper test would require more data on
access than are currently available. The second implication is that access and
efficiency are the key parts of the finance–growth mechanism, and so should be
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considered alongside size in growth regressions. New data on access in Kendall
et al. (2010) present an opportunity to consider the role of access in supplementing
the earlier finance and growth regressions. We present some regression results that
include proxies for efficiency, access, and financial depth. We find an important
role for access and efficiency, but none for financial depth.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 develops the simple
neoclassical model with a role for financial efficiency in determining the level of
technological progress. Section 3 presents the model of endogenous growth, first
without considering access to finance. Using the model with access, we develop the
implications for the relationship between long-run growth and financial efficiency,
value added, and access. Section 4 presents growth regressions that include proxies
for all three theoretical concepts of financial development. Section 5 offers some
concluding remarks.
2. BALANCED GROWTH AND FINANCE
Consider the neoclassical production function
Yt = F [Kt, Lt , At (ζt )], (1)
where capital,Kt , and labor,Lt , combine with a measure of technological progress,
At , to produce output and where F(·) has the usual characteristics, including
linear homogeneity. The parameter ζt denotes financial efficiency, which enters as
an input to the level of technological progress. In theoretical analyses of finance
and growth, something like ζt is generally the object of interest. Exactly how it
represents financial matters and how it enters into At can vary; for the purposes
of this model, we simply assert that greater financial efficiency increases the level
of technology, A′ > 0.
Typically not modeled are the costs associated with that financial efficiency.
Financial intermediary services provide, for example, specialized screening of
entrepreneurs of unknown type at a cost that reflects the efficiency of finance.
When firms pay those financial intermediaries, they allocate resources away from
investment or production. Financial value added is then the sum of such costs as
a proportion of aggregate output. When financial efficiency changes, the costs of
intermediation change and so the sum of resources going to financial services can
also change; that is, financial efficiency, financial value added, and the level of
technological progress are all connected.
Financial value added thus defined enters into the capital accumulation equation
as follows,
K˙t = Yt − Ct − D(ζt )Yt − δKt , (2)
where δ > 0 is the depreciation rate, D(ζt ) is financial value added based on the
costs of financial services, and there are no a priori assumptions about D′.3
The economy is on a BGP if and only if output, capital, consumption, and value
added are all positive and all grow at constant exponential rates gy , gk , gc, and gd,
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respectively, for all t ≥ 0:
Yt = Y0egy t , (3)
Kt = K0egkt , (4)
Ct = C0egct , (5)
Dt = D0egd t , (6)
where Dt is shorthand for D(ζt ). Assume that there is no growth in the labor
supply: Lt = L for all t ≥ 0. The first part of Proposition 1 makes clear that
if financial value added is related to financial efficiency, then improvements in
financial efficiency cannot be related to improvements in technology.
PROPOSITION 1. On the BGP, (i) financial efficiency cannot be related to
sustained technological progress unless it does not interact with financial value
added; and (ii) if financial efficiency is related to long-run technological change
without interacting with value added, it must be labor-augmenting.
Proof. The proof uses a variant of that of the Uzawa (1961) theorem found in
Schlicht (2006).4 We can rewrite (2) for t ≥ 0, using the definition of a BGP:
(δ + gk)K0 = e(gy−gk)tY0 − e(gy+gd−gk)tY0D0 − e(gc−gk)tC0. (7)
Taking the derivative of (7) with respect to time, we can see that on a BGP,
0 = (gy − gk)e(gy−gk)tY0 − (gy + gd − gk)e(gy+gd−gk)tY0D0
− (gc − gk)e(gc−gk)tC0. (8)
If gd +gy = gk, then it must be the case that gy = gc and (gy −gk)(Y0 −C0) = 0,
which cannot be true on a BGP, because it would imply that K0 < 0. As such, we
must have that D0 > 0, gd = 0, and gc = gy = gk ≥ 0.
Assume that technology At augments one or both of the factors of pro-
duction with coefficients of technological progress AK,t and AL,t . Then let
G(AK,tKt , AL,tLt ) := F(·). Using homogeneity of the production function, we
can write
Yt = G(e(gy−gk)tKt , egy tL), for any t ≥ 0. (9)
Because gy = gk , equation (9) shows that all technological progress, A˙t /At = gy ,
is purely labor-augmenting.
If D′ = 0, part (i) of the proposition follows from the BGP requirement
that gd = 0. If D′ = 0, part (ii) follows from the requirement that techno-
logical progress, including that due to financial efficiency, be Harrod-neutral on
BGPs.
The proposition has two main implications, one for the relationship between
financial efficiency and value added in an economy on a BGP, and another for the
relationship between financial efficiency and technological progress in balanced
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growth. Sustained progress in financial efficiency can only be part of technological
change if, first, financial efficiency does not affect financial value added and,
second, it is labor-augmenting. Both of these requirements might be considered
somewhat restrictive. Either way, the implication for financial value added is clear:
Away from a BGP, value added can vary, but in the long run it must be constant.
Sections 3 elaborates on the first of these two implications in the context of an
endogenous growth model. That generates a number of insights, some of which are
addressed in the empirical analysis of Section 4. The more general implications of
labor-augmenting technological change for finance and growth are left for future
research.
3. FINANCE AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH
In models of endogenous growth where financial efficiency matters, intermediaries
exist to screen potential entrepreneurs, to monitor research effort, or to evaluate
the quality of discoveries; that is, they intermediate between those who wish to
acquire new technologies or blueprints for intermediate goods and those who have
the ideas for those new technologies or blueprints.5 The expanding inputs model
expounded in Acemoglu (2009) serves as a useful framework within which to
explore the balanced growth connections between finance and growth. We adapt
that model to include a simple screening problem with which the intermediary can
be engaged. Other features of the model are standard, so we leave some details to
Acemoglu (2009).
3.1. Preferences and Technology
The representative household has constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(CIES) preferences, choosing consumption levels to maximize the present value
of discounted future utility,∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
C1−θt − 1
1 − θ
)
dt, (10)
where ρ > 0 is the discount rate of the household and θ ≥ 0 is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion.
Agents consume a perfectly competitive final good, Yt , the price of which is
normalized to one at each date. The production of the final good takes a Dixit–
Stiglitz form and uses labor, L, and a variety of machines, xt , as inputs,
Yt = 11 − β
[∫ Nt
0
xt (v)
1−βdv
]
Lβ, (11)
where v indexes input variety and Nt is the total number of machine input vari-
eties in existence at time t . The number Nt is thus our measure of technological
progress. The machines used as inputs to final good production are supplied by the
holders of blueprints for those machines. The discovery of new blueprints requires
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investment, Zt , in laboratory equipment. Where Xt is the total spent on machines
at t , the economywide resource constraint is
Yt ≥ Ct + Xt + Zt . (12)
3.2. Technological Progress and Finance
Some of the investment in laboratory equipment is dedicated to financial inter-
mediation of the King and Levine (1993b) type. Laboratory equipment can itself
be of different levels of quality: Capable (incapable) scientists have created good
(bad) laboratory equipment. A proportion φ ∈ (0, 1) of scientists are capable; the
remaining (1 − φ) are not. Only by investing in the good equipment, that created
by capable scientists, can new blueprints be discovered.
Machine producers can see who created what equipment, but it is infinitely
costly for them to see the type of scientist. Financial intermediaries exist to
reveal type by charging a fee for screening potential researchers. The screening
mechanism is perfect (the truth is always known, postscreen), but the efficiency
of the screening, ζt , determines its cost.6 For a given ζt , the evolution of new
blueprints then follows
N˙t = ηNZt [1 − f (ζt )], (13)
where ηN > 0 and f (ζt ) is the fee charged for intermediation, expressed in units
of laboratory equipment invested.7 The efficiency level ζt is exogenous but not
necessarily constant over time. The quantity of financial services as a proportion
of total output (financial value added) is then
Dt = f (ζt )Zt
Yt
. (14)
The fee charged is based on the screening problem faced by the intermediary.
Intermediaries face a cost z(ζt ) > 0 of screening scientists from the pool of
applicants, where z′ < 0. An intermediary chooses the fee that maximizes expected
profits from providing screening services,
E[profit] = φ[fZt − z(ζt )] + (1 − φ)[−z(ζt )]. (15)
Assuming competitive intermediation, the fee charged is simply
f ∗(ζt ) = z(ζt )
φZt
. (16)
Evidently, an increase in financial efficiency will, other things being equal,
reduce the fee charged for intermediation, increase the rate of discovery of new
blueprints, and decrease the level of financial value added. Despite running counter
to evidence, this is intuitive in a setup where financial intermediaries do nothing
other than funnel research funding to the right research activities. As such, this
implication is consistent with other finance and endogenous growth models, and
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Section 3.5 shows that reconciling the correlation between efficiency and value
added with data requires us to modify the model only slightly.
3.3. Equilibrium and the Balanced Growth Path
Profit maximization by the final goods producer yields the demands for machines
xt (v) = pxt (v)−1/βL, (17)
where pxt is the machine price set by the blueprint holder.
Letπt(v) ≡ pxt (v)xt (v)−ψxt(v) be the instantaneous profits which accrue from
selling machine variety v at time t . Given that the blueprint owner is a monopolist
in producing the machine variety, the price pxt (v) is chosen to maximize πt(v).
Because the demand for machines is isoelastic, the price pxt (v) is invariant across
time and machine variety so we normalize the marginal cost of machine production
to ψ = (1 −β). As such, the profit-maximizing price is pxt (v) = 1 and monopoly
profits are πt(v) = βL. The final good production function can then be written as
Yt = 11 − βNtL. (18)
Equation (18) implies that any balanced growth equilibrium where Yt grows at a
constant rate will also have Nt growing at a constant rate.
The net present discounted value of a perpetual license to a blueprint can be
written as
Vt(v) = πt(v) + V˙t (v)
rt
, (19)
where rt is the interest rate and V˙t (v) is the change in the net present value of a
blueprint over time [see Acemoglu (2009)].
When there is positive technological progress, free entry to research requires
that one unit of spending on equipment leads to an equal net present discounted
return to the blueprint holder,
[1 − f ∗(ζt )]ηNVt (v) = 1. (20)
An economy on a BGP is one in which the growth rate of output (and consump-
tion) is constant. Consumer optimization yields
gc = C˙t
Ct
= 1
θ
(rt − ρ). (21)
This Euler equation implies that a BGP is characterized by a constant interest rate.
Because profits on blueprint ownership are also constant over time, it must be the
case that V˙t (v) = 0. When this is combined with equations (19) and (20), the
equilibrium interest rate along a BGP is
r∗ = [1 − f ∗(ζt )]ηNβL, (22)
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which makes the equilibrium balanced growth rate equal to
g∗ = θ−1 {[1 − f ∗(ζt )]ηNβL − ρ} . (23)
Equation (23) implies that the higher the efficiency with which financial interme-
diaries screen scientists, the higher is the equilibrium growth rate.
3.4. Financial Efficiency and Financial Value Added along the Balanced
Growth Path
A direct result of equation (18) is that along a BGP, Nt must also grow at a constant
rate N˙t /Nt = g∗. We then have
PROPOSITION 2. Financial value added is constant on a balanced growth
equilibrium of the model.
Proof. The growth rate of new blueprints is
N˙t
Nt
= ηN [Zt − z(ζt )/φ]
Nt
, (24)
which must be constant on a BGP. Because total spending on machines is Xt =
(1−β)NtL, the BGP combined with the economywide resource constraint implies
that the growth rate of Zt must be constant also, which is not possible unless z(ζt ) is
proportional to Zt . With z(ζt ) proportional to Zt and using equation (16), financial
value added, equation (14), is a constant on a BGP.
Proposition 2 shows that a BGP requires that financial costs as a proportion
of research spending, z(ζt )/Zt , are constant; that is, relative financial efficiency
is constant. This can happen if ζt falls over time in such a way as to make z(ζt )
increase along with Zt , but it is more typical for something such as ζt itself to
reflect that relative financial efficiency. Thus, let z take the form
z(ζt ) = ηZZt
ζt
, (25)
with ηZ > 0. Then the optimal fee charged by intermediaries is constant on BGP:
f ∗(ζt ) = ηZ/(φζt ).8
This analysis provides a basis for the focus on relative financial efficiency
found in the theoretical literature.9 It also gives an idea about what must be
happening to financial value added along a BGP, because there is an implied
relationship between value added and efficiency when the BGP itself changes.
Suppose, for example, that relative financial efficiency increases. Because there
are no transition dynamics, the rate of growth of output and consumption along
the BGP immediately increases, but financial value added decreases—though
consumption growth is faster, the resources allocated to finance as a proportion of
output are smaller.
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The model as laid out so far suggests that it is not possible to have anything
other than a negative relationship between efficiency and value added on the
BGP. Though there has been evidence against the finance–growth nexus in some
countries and some time periods, there remains strong evidence that size does
matter in some countries, or has mattered over particular time periods. These
variations in the measured connection between finance and growth require that a
model of finance and growth should be able to account for both the presence and
the absence of a role for the size of the financial sector in explaining variations in
economic growth. Section 3.5 looks at what relaxations of the model are needed
to understand this inconstancy.
3.5. Access to Finance
A number of models of finance and growth assume that a part of financial devel-
opment can be an increase in the number of agents using financial services, in
addition to an increase in the efficiency with which they do so. A simple exposition
is Townsend (1983), where development can be characterized as a proportion of
all nonfinanced agents being “thrown” into the financial sector at the start of each
period. Additionally, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) model the relationship be-
tween inequality, growth, and the extent of financial development, and Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997) model barriers to risk sharing that are progressively overcome
through time.
Suppose that only some fraction λt ∈ [0, 1] of scientists are able to be screened,
regardless of their type. The proportion λt can affect both the cost of screening
and the rate of new discoveries. First, the larger the pool of scientists (the higher
is λt ) among whom the intermediary screens, the more costly it is to screen out
incapable scientists.10 The following formulation simply generalizes (25):
z(ζt , λt ) = λtηZZt
ζt
. (26)
Second, the rate of increase in new blueprints increases in the portion that have
access to finance. So the evolution of blueprints follows
N˙t = λtηN
(
1 − λtηZ
φζt
)
Zt, (27)
and the balanced path rate of growth is
g∗ = θ−1
[
λtηN
(
1 − λtηZ
φζt
)
βL − ρ
]
. (28)
As before, greater financial efficiency increases long-run growth. The impact
of access on growth depends on whether the costs from greater screening are
outweighed by the gains from the more rapid generation of ideas; i.e., if φζt >
2λtηZ, then greater access to finance increases long-run growth (and indeed this
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is necessary for positive growth). As already established, along a BGP, the ratio
Zt/Nt is constant. The effect of an increase in financial efficiency is to speed
up the rate of discovery of new blueprints; the effect of increasing access to
financial services is ambiguous, however. Compared with the model where access
is complete (λt = 1 for all t), the nature of financial development along the
BGP can be very different. Suppose that access and efficiency can both change
exogenously over time at rates λ˙t and ζ˙t , respectively. The BGP can then be
characterized by
PROPOSITION 3. On the BGP, financial value added increases at a rate pro-
portional to that at which access increases.
Proof. The BGP requires that N˙t /Nt is constant, which implies that
(
1 − 2λtηZ
φζt
)
λ˙t = −λ
2
t ηZ
φζ 2t
ζ˙t . (29)
Financial value added is Dt = λtf (ζt , λt )ϕ, where ϕ = Zt/Yt is the constant
share of output allocated to research. Taking the derivative of value added with
respect to time and using (29), the change of value added on the BGP is
D˙t = ϕλ˙t . (30)
Financial value added can grow while the economy is on the BGP if λ˙t > 0.
One solution to (29) is for the BGP to be characterized by no development in
access or efficiency, ζ˙t = λ˙t = 0. However, it is possible to have some forms
of financial development on BGP. If increasing access is growth-reducing (i.e., if
2λtηZ > φζt ), then it is possible to have ζ˙t > 0 and so λ˙t > 0 on the BGP. In
that case, value added and efficiency can both be increasing over time on a BGP.
Clearly, there is a limit to this when access becomes high (i.e., close to λ = 1).
What is the correlation between long-run growth and value added when access
to finance can change? Suppose that financial efficiency and access both increase
over time, and that they combine to increase growth by some d > 0:
(
1 − 2λtηZ
φζt
)
λ˙t + λ
2
t ηZ
φζ 2t
ζ˙t = d > 0. (31)
If 2λtηZ < φζt , equation (31) is the sum of the positive effects of increasing
access and efficiency on growth. Using (31), the change in value added is simply
D˙t = ϕ(λ˙t − d) = ϕ λtηZ
φζt
(
2λ˙t − λt
ζt
ζ˙t
)
,
which, using the expressions for value added,Dt = λtf (ζt , λt )ϕ, and equilibrium
fee, f (ζt , λt ), can be written as
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D˙t
Dt = ϕ
(
2
λ˙t
λt
− ζ˙t
ζt
)
. (32)
Equation (32) gives the change in value added associated with higher long-run
growth. If that higher growth is generated by greater access alone, then the cor-
relation between value added and growth will be positive. If the higher growth
comes from greater efficiency, however, this correlation can be negative.
To summarize, the model implies that greater financial efficiency will always
generate higher growth; that greater access will benefit growth if the faster idea
generation outweighs the greater screening costs; and that higher value added
can be associated with higher growth if additional screening costs outweigh the
additional idea generation and if access is the predominant source of finance-led
growth.
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The cross-country approach to understanding the empirical relationship between
financial and economic development, after King and Levine (1993a,1993b), has
concentrated on financial depth (the size of the financial sector as a proportion of
national output) as a measure of financial development. Regressions of average
rates of growth of GDP per capita on average levels of financial depth over the
period 1960–1989 identified a positive and sometimes causal connection running
from financial deepening to higher growth [see, e.g., Levine et al. (2000) and the
survey in Levine (2005)].
The theoretical model in Section 3 tells us two things of relevance for the empir-
ical study of finance and growth. The first is that the size of the financial sector may
not be a reliable indicator of growth driven by finance.11 The specific theoretical
implication of equation (32) is that only where higher growth is supported by
increasing access to finance rather than by increasing financial efficiency would
we observe a positive relationship between the size of the financial sector and
growth. Current cross-country data on access do not permit this implication to be
tested directly, but it is consistent with some extant empirical results. Rioja and
Valev (2004) found that the level of development can matter for the strength of the
impact of financial deepening on growth. If more developed countries already have
wide access to financial services, then more financial development would come
from greater efficiency and so the depth–growth connection would, according
to equation (32), be lower. The same logic would apply to Hasan et al. (2009),
which finds that the efficiency of financial intermediation dominates the quantity
of credit in its importance for growth in an empirical study of European countries.
Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) show that the impact of financial deepening on
growth has diminished in the later twentieth century, a finding apparently driven
by the incidence of financial crises. More recently, Demetriades and Rousseau
(2011) have found that banking supervision has become a more important indica-
tor of the financial development that matters for growth. Their interpretation that
894 ALEX TREW
TABLE 1. OLS growth regressions on access, depth, and efficiency
1 2 3 4 5 6
Access 1 0.71 0.74 0.74 — — —
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Access 2 — — — 0.39 0.40 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.70)
Depth 1 0.26 — — 0.41 — —
(0.59) (0.37)
Depth 2 — −0.63 — — 0.45 —
(0.60) (0.15)
Depth 3 — — 0.18 — — 0.35
(0.73) (0.25)
Efficiency −15.46 −20.10 −19.14 −17.72 −17.05 −26.27
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
n 64 64 53 90 90 77
R2 0.29 0.29 0.38 0.21 0.22 0.32
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust p values. All variables are averaged over 1987–2008 except access, which
is dated around 2004. The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita; access 1 is
log of commercial bank deposit accounts per 100,000 adults; access 2 is commercial bank branches per 100,000
adults; depth 1 is private credit to GDP; depth 2 is liquid liabilities; depth 3 is stock market capitalization; efficiency
is net interest margin; all regressions are conditioned on log GDP in 1987.
the quality of financial development has become more important than the quantity
of financial development echoes the theoretical trade-off between efficiency and
value added.
The second implication of the model is that financial efficiency and access
should be considered alongside a measure of the size of the financial sector in
growth regressions. This can be tested using new data on access to financial
services in Kendall et al. (2010). Table 1 reports OLS regressions of growth on
various measures of access and depth and a measure of efficiency. The dependent
variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita over the period
1987–2008, and all regressions are conditioned on log initial GDP. Data on GDP
and growth are from Heston et al. (2011). The access to finance data is from
Kendall et al. (2010), and we use the log of the number of commercial bank
branches per hundred thousand adults and the log of commercial bank deposit
accounts per hundred thousand adults. Financial depth and efficiency data are
from Beck et al. (2000). We use three common measures of financial depth: the
ratios of private credit, liquid liabilities, and stock market capitalization to GDP.
Financial efficiency is measured as the net interest margin (so it has a negative
correlation with growth).
As found in other studies that consider a similar time period, such as Rousseau
and Wachtel (2011), depth is not statistically significant in any permutation of
the reported regressions. Financial efficiency is strongly significant, as would be
implied by the theory. In addition, the access variable is statistically significant
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in all but one permutation. The number of commercial bank deposit accounts
per 100,000 adults is always strongly statistically significant. The number of
commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults is statistically significant in two
of the three permutations. Although these results are only indicative correlations,
they suggest that access could have an important role in explaining variations
in growth. Even where the size of the financial sector is not significant, as in
these regressions, incorporating efficiency and access in addition to a measure of
depth adds to our understanding of what forms of financial development can con-
tribute to long-run growth. Further research to identify causality requires additional
data.12
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has developed an endogenous growth model incorporating access to
financial services as well as financial efficiency. The model suggests that our
attention should be concentrated on those aspects of financial development that
are more fundamentally growth-promoting as opposed to the measures of the size
of the financial sector. Although theoretical studies on finance and growth have not
generally used depth or value added to proxy for financial development, empirical
studies have used depth to identify the nexus in the data. By drawing out the
theoretical implications for value added, we have seen why empirical estimates
on the relationship between value added (or depth) and growth can be unreliable.
A focus on the quality of financial intermediation, rather than its quantity, appears
key.
There are a number of potential extensions to this paper. The conception of
financial efficiency could be expanded beyond simply the cost of screening en-
trepreneurs. This would have implications for the implied relationship between
efficiency and value added if lower transaction costs or greater risk sharing were
related to higher growth via the size of the financial system, as in Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997). Further, the connections between efficiency and access could be
explored in a model where access was endogenous to the costs of using financial
services. Finally, it would be interesting to consider a model with capital. The
Uzawa (1961) theorem holds that, along a BGP, all technological change must
be labor-augmenting. Making a distinction between financial intermediations that
separately benefit the discovery of capital- and labor-augmenting technologies
would be a direction for future theoretical and empirical research. Models in
which the direction of financial innovation matters could follow from work such
as Laeven et al. (2009) in which financial development itself is endogenous, and
might lead to a richer understanding of the nature of financial development in
economies that go through a period of takeoff in long-run growth.
The implications for empirical research have been discussed. Measures of the
size of the financial sector appear unreliable as growth determinants. The impor-
tance of access in explaining a positive correlation between efficiency and value
added suggests ways to approach the empirical estimation of the finance–growth
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nexus, with a particular focus on the importance and determinants of access to
finance. Data such as those of Kendall et al. (2010) are well placed to enable such
research.
NOTES
1. See Levine (2005) and Beck (2008) for surveys.
2. See Capasso (2004) for a survey of the theoretical literature.
3. Thus the total size of the financial sector is D(ζt )Yt , which can grow as the economy grows. We
could otherwise have let the absolute size of the financial sector be some F(ζt ) and then have financial
value added as D(ζt ) = F(ζt )/Yt .
4. See also Jones and Scrimgeour (2008).
5. Consider the screening of entrepreneurial type in King and Levine (1993b) and Morales (2003)
and the monitoring of effort in de la Fuente and Marı´n (1996) and Blackburn and Hung (1998).
6. We also assume that the information from screening is public (so incapable scientists receive no
compensation) but that households represent a diversified pool of scientists. This is in the spirit of the
original King and Levine (1993b) model.
7. We are restricting ourselves throughout to equilibria where [1 − f (ζt )] > φ, i.e., where screen-
ing is always better than not screening. The results that follow are not sensitive to the way in which
the financial cost enters here. We could equally specify N˙t = ηN [Zt − f (ζt )] and balanced growth
implications for financial value added would remain the same (though with a different implied cost
structure for intermediation) and the economy-wide resource constraint would include f separately
from Z; see endnote 8.
8. If we had assumed N˙t = ηN [Zt − f (ζt )], then f would be the total fee for intermediation
and value added would be Dt = f (ζt )/Yt = z(ζt )/(φYt ) because now f ∗ = z(ζt )/φ. Balanced
growth again requires that financial costs z(ζt ) be proportional to Z along a BGP and so value added
is constant.
9. Even in models where financial innovation is endogenous, average financial efficiency is constant
along the BGP. In Laeven et al. (2009), aggregate financial efficiency is constant in the steady state,
whereas for Greenwood et al. (2010), relative financial efficiency (and proportion of resources allocated
to monitoring) is constant along a BGP.
10. For a given amount of research funding to allocate, the higher λt , the more screening the
intermediary is required to do.
11. The concept of financial sector size used in the model is the contribution of the financial sector
to total output, whereas in the data it is financial depth. The former clearly has to be less than one,
but the latter can be larger. Ideally, we would have measures of the contribution of the financial sector
to output for a large range of countries over a substantial period of time, but, at present, this is only
available for OECD countries. For the OECD countries, we can use data from the STAN Structural
Analysis Database, OECD (2010). The most relevant measure of value added relative to total economy
is for finance, insurance, real estate, and business services as a whole. For the period we study in
the following (1987–2008), the correlation coefficients between average value added and standard
concepts of financial depth are quite high: for liquid liabilities to GDP ratio, 0.61; for stock market
capitalization, 0.58; for bank deposits, 0.63; and for private credit, 0.40. As such, we use depth as a
proxy for the value added concept in the theory.
12. Particularly because here access is only available widely around the end of the period over which
we average other variables.
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